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SECURITIES/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—INTERNAL
REPORTERS WHO BLOW THE WHISTLE: ARE THEY PROTECTED
UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S ANTI-RETALIATION
PROVISION?

Kristin Goodchild *
In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and
Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), which was
a sweeping piece of legislation that required the
implementation of new rules and regulations throughout the
financial industry. Interpretative ambiguity exists within the
Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower program, which provides a
definition of who qualifies as a whistleblower, and an antiretaliation provision, which is intended to protect
whistleblowers from retaliation. The ambiguity arises because a
whistleblower is defined as an individual who makes a report to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”).
However, the anti-retaliation provision describes three
categories of protected whistleblowing activities, one of which
can be construed as an exception to the whistleblower
definition since it does not require disclosure to the SEC. The
SEC sought to clarify this ambiguity by issuing a rule (the
“SEC’s Rule”) explaining that retaliation protection under the
Dodd-Frank Act extends to an individual who only reports
possible securities law violations through his employer’s
internal whistleblowing procedures.
The Second and Fifth Circuits and several district courts have
weighed in. The Fifth Circuit and the minority of district courts
have determined that there is no ambiguity and, according to
the definition of whistleblower, an individual must report
potential securities law violations to the SEC to receive
retaliation protection. The Second Circuit and a majority of
district courts have determined that there is ambiguity and the
SEC’s Rule is a reasonable interpretation that should be given
deference in order to provide retaliation protection to an
1
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individual who only makes an internal report to his employer.
This Note will advocate that future circuit courts of appeal and
district courts should follow the Second Circuit and majority of
district courts’ interpretation that the Dodd-Frank Act’s antiretaliation provision provides protection to employeewhistleblowers who report possible securities law violations
internally from the retaliatory actions of their employers, as
internal reporting has many important benefits. These benefits
include: allowing a company to investigate allegations of
misconduct and self-report violations to the SEC; assisting the
SEC in avoiding costs associated with initiating investigations
and enforcement actions; protecting employees who may face
ethical dilemmas by reporting externally; and providing
protection to loyal employees who prefer to report internally.
By failing to protect employee-whistleblowers who report
internally, future circuit courts of appeal and district courts will
impair the very purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and will
encourage retaliation against the group of individuals who are
the most in need of retaliation protection.

INTRODUCTION
Image this scenario: You have worked for XYZ, Inc. as an
engineer and supervisor for twelve years.1 You have always
received positive performance reviews, have been awarded
numerous discretionary bonuses, and have been told you are a
valued employee.2 At one point, you learn that one of your direct
reports is possibly embezzling from the company, which you fear
amounts to fraud against shareholders.3 After your direct report
refuses your directive to cease these actions, you report this
conduct to your direct supervisor and ask that your direct report’s

* Candidate for J.D., 2016, Western New England University School of Law. I
would like to thank the Western New England Law Review staff for all their hard work
throughout the editorial process. I would also like to thank Professor René ReichGraefe, Western New England School of Law, for his insight, guidance, and feedback
throughout the writing process. Finally, to my husband and family, thank you for your
support and patience.
1. See Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 2013). This
scenario was developed from the facts of the Banko case.
2. Id.
3. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (prohibiting securities fraud,
including theft from investors).
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employment be terminated.4 When your direct supervisor does
nothing, you report these inappropriate actions and possible
securities law violations to upper management and again ask for
your direct report’s termination.5 Even after upper management
finds over forty instances of misconduct, your direct report still has
her job and you are told to stop pursuing the matter.6 Still
believing this conduct could result in securities law violations, you
notify the human resource department.7 Following subsequent
meetings that you are not invited to attend, your direct report’s
employment is terminated.8 However, upper management is angry
that you ignored their request to leave the matter alone and went
to human resources.9 Shortly thereafter, you receive praise for
completing a new prototype before your holiday break.10 Upon
your return, you receive a large discretionary bonus.11 Then, less
than two weeks later, you are fired.12
This is a familiar scenario faced by many employees who blow
the whistle and report potential securities law violations to their
employers.
These employee-whistleblowers usually face two
reporting choices. First, they can report the possible securities law
violations to their employers hoping their employers will remedy
the situation, but may very well suffer employment retaliation, such
as altered job responsibilities or termination.13 Second, these
employees can report the possible violations to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), which tends to be the less
favored method for employee-whistleblowers for a number of
reasons,14 and still fear retaliation by their employers. While the
second category of employee-whistleblowers is explicitly protected
from retaliation under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer
Protection Act15 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), it is unclear whether the
Dodd-Frank Act also protects the first category of employee-

4. See Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 752.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 752–753.
10. Id. at 753.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See infra Part III.C.
14. See infra Parts III.A–C.
15. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in various sections of
Titles 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 of the United States Code).

4

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

whistleblowers from retaliation by their employers. This Note will
advocate that the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation provision
should be interpreted to also protect the first category of
employee-whistleblowers from their employers’ retaliatory actions.
In response to the financial crisis of 2008,16 Congress enacted
the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 to overhaul the United States financial
industry.17 At over 2,300 pages, the Dodd-Frank Act was a
sweeping piece of legislation that required the implementation of
over 400 new rules and regulations throughout the industry.18
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 193419 (the “Exchange Act”) by adding Section
21F, titled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection”20
(the “Whistleblower Program”).21 The Whistleblower Program
includes an anti-retaliation provision,22 a bounty provision,23
provides a definition of who qualifies as a whistleblower24 (the
“whistleblower definition”), and gives the SEC broad rulemaking
authority in order to implement the Whistleblower Program.25
Congress, tasked with responding to the financial crisis, was
quick to implement the Dodd-Frank Act—and with it, the
Whistleblower Program. This resulted in certain definitional and
structural ambiguities and disconnects. As a result, there is
interpretative ambiguity between the whistleblower definition and
16. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
390–91 (Jan. 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
[http://perma.cc/87YC-R5BW]. From 2007 to the first quarter of 2009, $17 trillion of
household net worth was lost and, from 2007 to December 2009, 8.3 million jobs were
lost. Id. The unemployment rate reached a high of 17.4% in October 2009. Id.
17. Recent Legislation, Corporate Law – Securities Regulation – Congress
Expands Incentives for Whistleblowers to Report Suspected Violations to the SEC.,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1829 (2011) [hereinafter Incentives for Whistleblowers].
18. Id.; Oversight of Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, COMM’N ON FIN. SERVS.,
http://financialservices.house.gov/dodd-frank/
[http://perma.cc/PD37-NED4]
(last
visited Sept. 21, 2015).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2014).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2014).
21. Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17, at 1831.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2014). The anti-retaliation provision provides a
private right of action to an employee-whistleblower for the retaliatory actions of his
employer as a result of the employee’s whistleblowing activity. Id.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2014). Under the bounty provision, an individual is
entitled to receive an award from the SEC for providing information to the SEC that
leads to a successful enforcement action. Id. The amount of the award ranges from ten
to thirty percent of the monetary sanction collected by the SEC in an enforcement
action against the employer. Id.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2014).
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the anti-retaliation provision. The Dodd-Frank Act defines a
whistleblower as “any individual who provides . . . information
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the [SEC], in a
manner established, by rule or regulation, by the [SEC].”26 On the
other hand, the anti-retaliation provision describes three different
categories of protected whistleblowing activities, one of which can
be construed as an exception to the whistleblower definition since
it does not require disclosure to the SEC.27 If this subsection of the
anti-retaliation provision is read as an exception to the
whistleblower definition, it could provide anti-retaliation
protection to an employee-whistleblower who only makes an
internal report to his employer through his employer’s internal
whistleblowing procedures, rather than making an external
disclosure to the SEC.
Using its rulemaking authority,28 the SEC interpreted the antiretaliation provision as such.29 The SEC recently submitted amicus
curiae briefs in Second Circuit and Third Circuit cases to support
its interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision.30 The Second
Circuit declined to rule on the issue31 and the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the plaintiff did not disclose
misconduct contained within subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation

26. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2014).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j).
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (West 2015), invalidated by Asadi v. G.E. Energy
(USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
30. Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, Safarian v.
Am. DG Energy Inc., No. 10-6082, slip op. at 1 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, remanded to No. 14-2734, 2015 WL 4430837 (3d Cir. July 21,
2015) (No. 14-2734) [hereinafter Safarian Brief]; Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Appellant, Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2014) (No.
13-4385) [hereinafter Meng-Lin Brief].
31. Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2014). Meng-Lin
worked as a compliance officer in China for Siemens China, Ltd., a Chinese subsidiary
of Siemens AG (collectively, “Siemens”), a German corporation listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. Id. at 177. He discovered improper payments to certain North
Korean and Chinese officials. Id. After he reported the improper payments to
Siemens through its internal procedures, he was retaliated against by Siemens and
ultimately fired. Id. After his termination, Meng-Lin reported the improper payments
to the SEC. Id. The district court granted Siemens’ motion to dismiss on the ground
that the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation provision does not apply extraterritorially.
Id. at 177–78. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at 183. However, in a recent
case, the Second Circuit held that there is ambiguity and the SEC’s Rule is a reasonable
interpretation. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *1
(2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015).
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provision.32
Unlike the Second and Third Circuits in these cases, very
recently, the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, and several district
courts have weighed in on the issue. The Fifth Circuit and a
minority of district courts in California, Colorado, Florida,
Missouri, and Wisconsin have determined that the anti-retaliation
provision is unambiguous and, according to the whistleblower
definition, only protects individuals from retaliation who report
securities law violations to the SEC.33 In contrast, the Second
Circuit and a majority of district courts in California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, and Tennessee have found that the anti-retaliation provision
is ambiguous.34 These courts held that either, on its face, the anti-

32. Safarian v. Am. DG Energy Inc., No. 10-6082, slip op. at 1 (D.N.J. Apr. 29,
2014). Safarian worked as an engineer for American DG Energy, Inc. (“American”), a
utility company. Id. at 1. He reported overbilling, improper construction, and failure
to obtain necessary permits to American. Id. Safarian’s employment was later
terminated. Id. The district court granted American’s motion for summary judgment,
in part, because Safarian failed to disclose any misconduct listed in subsection (iii) of
the anti-retaliation provision. Id. at 1, 4. The district court noted that it did not need to
decide whether Safarian’s failure to make a report to the SEC precluded his claim. Id.
at 4. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on the Dodd-Frank Act
issue, but vacated the court’s ruling on other issues and remanded for further
proceedings. Safarian v. Am. DG Energy Inc., No. 14-2734, 2015 WL 4430837 at *1, *3
(3d Cir. July 21, 2015).
33. See Lutzeier v. Citigroup Inc., 305 F.D.R. 107, 110 (E.D. Mo. 2015);
Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 646 (E.D. Wis. 2014); Asadi v.
G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013); Englehart v. Career
Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 2619501, at *1, *7 (M.D. Fla. May 12,
2014); Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wagner v. Bank
of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *1, *5 (D. Colo. 2013); see
also infra Part II.C.1.
34. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *9
(2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., No. C-14-5180 EMC, 2015 WL
4483955, at *1, *12 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2015), appeal filed No. 15-80136, 2015 WL
4483955 (9th Cir. July 31, 2015); Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014
WL 5473144, at *1, *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F.
Supp. 3d 719, 732–33 (D. Neb. 2014); Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519,
534 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149
(SDW)(MCA), slip op. 1, 6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters
(Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977
F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF),
2013 WL 2190084, at *1, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2014); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp.
2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012
WL 4444820, at *1, *4–*5 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention,
Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10
Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011); see also infra Part
II.C.2. It is interesting to note that there is a split in the district courts in California and
Colorado.
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retaliation provision protects individuals who only make internal
reports,35 or the SEC’s construction of the anti-retaliation provision
(the “SEC’s Rule” or the “Rule”)36 is a reasonable interpretation
and should be given deference.37 Thus, the majority of courts
currently believe that employee-whistleblowers who report
securities law violations through their employer’s internal
whistleblowing procedures should also be protected from
retaliation pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation
provision.38
This Note will argue that future district courts and circuit
courts of appeal should adopt the SEC and majority of courts’ view
that the anti-retaliation provision is ambiguous and should give the
SEC’s Rule deference in order to protect employee-whistleblowers
who only report securities law violations internally from the
retaliatory actions of their respective employers. The SEC’s Rule

35. See Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 732–33; Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 534; Genberg,
935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 994; Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *1;
see also infra Part II.C.2.b.
36. The SEC’s Rule provides as follows:
For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by [the antiretaliation provision] . . . you are a whistleblower if: (i) You possess a
reasonable belief that the information you are providing relates to a possible
securities law violation . . . that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur,
and; (ii) You provide that information in a manner described in [subsections
(i)-(iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities] . . . . (iii) The
anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you satisfy the requirements,
procedures and conditions to qualify for an award.
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1) (West 2015), invalidated by Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA),
L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
37. See Berman, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1; Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *13;
Connolly, 2014 WL 5473144, at *6; Khazin, No. 13-4149 (SDW)(MCA), slip op. at 6;
Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147; Ellington, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 45; Murray, 2013 WL
2190084, at *7; Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4–5; see also infra Part II.C.2.a.
38. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *9
(2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., No. C-14-5180 EMC, 2015 WL
4483955, at *1, *12 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2015), appeal filed No. 15-80136, 2015 WL
4483955 (9th Cir. July 31, 2015); Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014
WL 5473144, at *1, *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F.
Supp. 3d 719, 732–33 (D. Neb. 2014); Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519,
534 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149
(SDW)(MCA), slip op. 1, 6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters
(Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977
F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF),
2013 WL 2190084, at *1, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2014); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp.
2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012
WL 4444820, at *1, *4–*5 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention,
Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10
Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
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and its interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation
provision is in line with the SEC’s enforcement objectives; will
encourage employees to report internally through their employers’
whistleblowing procedures; and will protect such employees from
retaliation by their employers.39 Further, it will obviate the need
for employees to acquire expert legal advice before engaging in
whistleblowing in order to determine which available
whistleblowing activity provides the maximum retaliation
protection.
Internal reporting using a company’s whistleblower
procedures is a useful tool that allows a company to investigate
allegations of misconduct and self-report violations to the SEC.40
Self-reporting violations of corporate misconduct is important to a
company’s long-term reputation in the marketplace and allows the
SEC to impose reduced fines and sanctions.41 Self-reporting is also
beneficial to the SEC, since the SEC will not need to incur the costs
associated with initiating a hostile investigation and enforcement
proceeding against a company.42 In particular, the SEC is
understaffed to investigate potential misconduct solely on its own
initiative.43
Further, employees and corporate officers are subject to
certain fiduciary duties or hold professional designations in which
they are required to adhere to certain confidentiality and ethical
rules to act in the best interests of their clients and/or employers.44
39. Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 18–20.
40. See Norman D. Bishara et al., The Mouth of Truth, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 37,
40 (2013); see also infra Part III.B.
41. See Bishara et al., supra note 40; see also Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al.,
Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance: Promoting
Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment,
20 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 191 (2002).
42. Terry Morehead Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MNCS, and Peace, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 457, 463 (2002); Bishara, supra note 40, at 39.
43. “Governments, strapped for resources, facing shrinking budgets, global
competitive pressures to liberalized trade, and corporate regulatory resistance, are
increasingly experimenting with approaches that rely on organizations themselves to
complement standard-setting and enforcement activities.” Orly Lobel, Lawyering
Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within Twenty-First-Century New Governance,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1267 (2009).
44. Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate
Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 875, 883 (2002); see CFA INST., CODE OF ETHICS & STANDARDS
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § III (2014), http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/
ccb.v2014.n6.1 [http://perma.cc/KEY2-K9YT]; AM. INST. OF CPAS, AICPA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5-7 or §0.300.060.020-.070 (2015), http://www.aicpa.org/
Research/Standards/CodeofConduct/DownloadableDocuments/2014December15Cont
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These employees face ethical dilemmas without a clear prevailing
regulatory mandate that they are not to fear retaliation for only
reporting internally. In addition, employee-whistleblowers tend to
be long-term employees who feel loyal to their respective
employers and believe the internal reporting of misconduct is in the
companies’ best interests.45
As such, these employeewhistleblowers prefer to report misconduct internally first and most
often turn to external reporting only when they fear retaliation by
their employers.46
In order to better understand the more inclusive treatment of
whistleblowers under the SEC’s Rule, Part I of this Note will
provide a brief history of the creation of the SEC and its mission
and strategic goals; the shifting public policy regarding
whistleblowing; and a brief examination of a previously
implemented securities law whistleblower statute and its failure to
adequately protect whistleblowers seeking its protection. Part II
will discuss the implementation and scope of the Dodd-Frank Act;
the SEC’s Rule; the Fifth Circuit and minority courts’ view that the
anti-retaliation provision is unambiguous and requires reporting to
the SEC in order to receive protection from retaliation; the Second
Circuit and majority courts’ view that the anti-retaliation provision
is ambiguous and should be construed as an exception to the
whistleblower definition in order to provide retaliation protection
to employee-whistleblowers who report securities law violations
internally; and the SEC’s interpretation that the anti-retaliation
provision also provides protection to employee-whistleblowers who
only make internal reports to their employers. Part III begins with
a consideration of the confidentiality and ethical obligations of
employees holding professional designations and corporate
officers’ fiduciary duties; the benefits advanced by protecting
internal reporters, including company incentives for self-reporting
violations of misconduct; employer behavior towards employeewhistleblowers and employee loyalty; and, finally, public policy
considerations.
I.

CREATION OF THE SEC AND PREVIOUS SECURITIES LAW

entAsof2015April23CodeofConduct.pdf [http://perma.cc/TK4X-62R8]. See also infra
Part III.A.
45. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1142 (2006). See infra Part III.C.
46. Callahan et al., supra note 41, at 195; Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by
the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 110–19 (2012).

10

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTE
A. SEC: Its History, Mission, and Strategic Objectives
Prior to the stock market crash in 1929, little federal regulation
of the securities markets existed.47 Following the end of World
War I in 1918,48 there was a surge of investment activity as small to
large investors, inspired by “rags to riches” stories and readily
available credit, set out to make their fortunes in the stock
market.49 After the stock market crashed in October 1929, nearly
half of the $50 billion of new securities offered since the end of
World War I became worthless, causing investors and the banks
that loaned to those investors to lose great sums of money.50 As a
result, public confidence in the securities markets deteriorated.51
It was agreed that, in order for the economy to recover, public
confidence in the securities markets needed to be restored and
maintained.52 After hearings to identify problems and solutions,
Congress passed the Securities Act of 193353 (the “Securities Act”)
and the Exchange Act54 in an effort to restore investor confidence
in the securities markets, provide investors and the markets with
reliable information, and establish rules regarding honest dealing.55
Together, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act created the
SEC to “enforce the newly-passed securities laws, to promote
stability in the markets and, most importantly, to protect
investors.”56
The SEC’s mission “is to protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”57
To achieve its mission, the SEC seeks to establish and maintain an

47. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [http://perma.cc/4EXZ-6UGM] (last visited
Sept. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Investor’s Advocate].
48.
World War I History, HIST., http://www.history.com/topics/world-wari/world-war-i-history [http://perma.cc/S9EF-GL8T](last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
49. Investor’s Advocate, supra note 47.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2014).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2014).
55. Investor’s Advocate, supra note 47.
56. Id.
57. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018
3
(2014),
http://www.sec.gov/about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V6P6-GJKL].
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effective regulatory framework, promote and enforce compliance
with the securities laws, and facilitate investor access to
information necessary to make informed investment decisions.58
The SEC strives to promote quality disclosure to prevent abusive
practices, to ensure capital markets operate in a fair, efficient, and
transparent fashion, to ensure market participants understand and
comply with their obligations under the federal securities laws, to
detect and deter federal securities law violations, and to hold
federal securities law violators accountable for their actions.59 To
help administer the Whistleblower Program and to further the
SEC’s mission, the SEC established the Office of the
Whistleblower (the “OWB”) to assist in identifying and stopping
fraud quickly and early thus minimizing investor losses.60
B. Securities Law Whistleblower Statute Before the Dodd-Frank
Act
Whistleblowing has a long history dating back to when Venice
was a city-state between the seventh and eighteenth centuries.61 In
order to expose and deter official misconduct, in particular to
curtail tax evasion and increase city-state security, the government
of Venice established a system for citizens to provide anonymous
reports regarding misconduct.62 Citizens would insert reports of
official misconduct into the carved head of a lion statue sitting
outside a government building.63
Since then, public policy regarding whistleblowing has shifted
from almost exclusively relying on external whistleblowing to also
encouraging internal whistleblowing as regulators seek to end
wrongdoing rather than to strictly punish a company.64 Internal

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 5.
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE
DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM
4
(2014),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/N5K5S4XQ] [hereinafter 2014 Annual Report].
61. Bishara et al., supra note 40, at 39. The history of Venice as a city-state dates
back to the sixth century and continued until the eighteenth century when Napoleon
and his army forced Venice to adopt a pro-French democratic government. Robert
Wilde,
Venice:
The
History
of
Venice,
Italy,
ABOUT
EDUC.,
http://europeanhistory.about.com/od/italyandthecitystates/a/venice.htm
[http://perma.cc/S53H-HYAV] (last visited Sept. 22, 2015).
62. Bishara, supra note 40, at 38 & n.2.
63. Id. at 39.
64. Dworkin, supra note 42. “With recent scandals in both the private and public
sectors being exposed by internal whistleblowers, courts emphasize that ‘[p]ublic policy
58.
59.
60.
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whistleblowing is seen as an effective tool in deterring corporate
misconduct and often reveals misconduct long before a
governmental agency or external party would be able to discover
it.65 It also promotes corporate self-monitoring, is less harmful to
the company, is more ethical since external reporting can be seen
as disloyal, and saves regulatory agency resources by reducing
investigating and monitoring costs.66
Following corporate scandals such as Enron67 and Worldcom,68
Congress, in its pursuit to combat and deter fraud in the securities
markets and promote internal whistleblowing, enacted the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).69 SOX was enacted to foster
investor confidence by “improving the accuracy and reliability of
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws”70 and
by providing more publicly available information on companies to
assist investors in making informed investment decisions.71 It also
signified Congress’ “new approach to regulation that relies on
internal monitoring [and internal] reporting.”72
SOX established a civil cause of action for whistleblowers who
suffered retaliatory actions by their employers and criminalized
favors the exposure of crime, and the cooperation of citizens possessing knowledge
thereof is essential to effective implementation of that policy.’” Lobel, supra note 43,
at 1251 (quoting Joiner v. Benton Cmty. Bank, 411 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Il. 1980)).
65. Bishara, supra note 40.
66. Id. at 39–40; Dworkin, supra note 42, at 463 & n.43.
67. A former Enron employee discovered accounting violations in which she
believed Enron was using its own company stock to generate gains and losses on its
income statement. Baynes, supra note 44, at 877. Days before Enron was to announce
a huge third quarter loss, its external auditors warned Enron officials that its public
explanation for the loss was potentially misleading. Id. at 880. On October 16, 2001,
Enron announced a $618 million loss. Id. The SEC initiated an investigation and
determined that since 1997 Enron had overstated its earnings by approximately $586
million. Id. Enron subsequently filed for bankruptcy in December 2001. Id.
68. Worldcom once operated “the world’s largest Internet network.” Lusia
Beltran, Worldcom filed largest bankruptcy ever, CNNMONEY (July 22, 2002, 10:35
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/19/news/worldcom_bankruptcy/
[http://perma.cc/S53H-HYAV]. In 1999, business began to decline. Id. Questions
arose surrounding allegations that the company incorrectly accounted for $3.8 billion in
operating expenses and $366 million in personal loans made to the CEO. Id.
Worldcom filed for bankruptcy in 2002. Id. At the time, “Worldcom’s bankruptcy
[was] the largest in United States history.” Id.
69. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1514A) (amended 2015 not yet published); Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled
Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely
Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 67 (2007).
70. 116 Stat. 745.
71. See Baynes, supra note 44, at 890.
72. Lobel, supra note 43, at 1251.
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retaliation.73 SOX was intended “to motivate employees to blow
the whistle by providing employees who make complaints with
protection from employer retaliation in the workplace.”74 It also
required public companies to establish policies and procedures for
anonymous employee disclosures of misconduct to the boards of
directors.75
To receive protection under SOX, an employee must assist in
an investigation by Congress, a federal agency, a supervisor, or
anyone the employer authorizes to conduct an investigation.76 If
the employee suffers retaliation, the employee has 180 days to file a
claim with the Secretary of Labor (the “Secretary”).77 The
Secretary has 180 days to issue a final order, but, if the Secretary
fails to issue the final order within 180 days, the employee can bring
a civil claim in a federal district court.78
However, SOX has failed to protect a great majority of
employees who have sought its protection.79 During the first three
years after SOX’s enactment in 2002, 491 employees filed claims.80
The Department of Labor (“DoL”) resolved 361 of these claims
and found in favor of the employees in only thirteen cases or 3.6%
of the time.81 Ninety-three of these claims were appealed to an
Administrative Law Judge in the DoL, who found in favor of the
employee in six cases or 6.5% of the time.82 Further, between 2005
and 2011 only ten employees succeeded in their SOX claims.83 To
put these statistics in perspective, from SOX’s enactment in 2002
until the end of 2011, a total of 1,260 claims were decided by the
DoL and employees succeeded only 1.8% of the time.84
Additionally, between 2006 and 2008 the DoL did not decide any

73. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (2013) (civil action); 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2013)
(criminal penalty); Rapp, supra note 46, at 82.
74. Rapp, supra note 46, at 82.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B) (2014); Baynes, supra note 44, at 890.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2013); Baynes, supra note 44, at 890.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2013); Baynes, supra note 44, at 890.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2013); Baynes, supra note 44, at 890. Remedies
available under SOX include compensatory damages (such as reinstatement and back
pay with interest) and special damages (such as litigation costs and attorneys’ fees). 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2013); Baynes, supra note 44, at 890.
79. Moberly, supra note 69.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years
Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2012).
84. Id. at 29.
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case in favor of an employee.85 One of the reasons for the low
employee success rate is that the DoL and the Administrative Law
Judges frequently found that the employee violated a procedural
rule or did not meet the then ninety-day statute of limitations to
file their claims.86 These figures illustrate that SOX has failed to
fulfill its purpose of providing adequate anti-retaliation
protection.87 They further illustrate that when whistleblowing
occurs, retaliation happens, and SOX anti-retaliation protection
does not work as well as it should.
II. IMPLEMENTATION AND SCOPE OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT,
SEC’S RULE, AND CONFLICT BETWEEN THE WHISTLEBLOWER
DEFINITION AND THE ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION
A. Implementation and Scope of the Whistleblower Program
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, Congress enacted
the Dodd-Frank Act “[t]o promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices . . . .”88 The Dodd-Frank Act is
considered “‘the first comprehensive statute of national scope’
protecting corporate whistleblowers.”89 Congress sought to protect
and encourage individuals to report possible securities law
violations by enacting the Whistleblower Program as part of the
Dodd-Frank Act, which includes the whistleblower definition, the
anti-retaliation provision, and the bounty provision.90
The Whistleblower Program91 defines a whistleblower as “any
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of
the securities laws to the [SEC], in a manner established, by rule or
85. Id.
86. Moberly, supra note 69, at 71. At the time of publication of this article, the
SOX statute of limitations was ninety days. When SOX was amended in 2010, the
statute of limitations was increased to 180 days. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D)
(2013).
87. Moberly, supra note 69, at 74.
88. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (codified in
scattered sections of Titles 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 of the United States Code);
Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17.
89. Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17 (quoting Robert G. Vaugh,
American’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57
ADMIN. L. REV 1, 4 (2005)).
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2014).
91. Id.
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regulation, by the [SEC].”92 The anti-retaliation provision affords
an individual with a private right of action against his employer for
retaliatory actions.93 The anti-retaliation provision provides that:
[n]o employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten,
harass, directly or indirectly, or in any manner discriminate
against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the [SEC] in accordance
with this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in an
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the
[SEC] based upon or related to such information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected
under [SOX] . . . and any other law, rule, or regulation
subject to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].94

(Subsections (i)–(iii) will hereinafter be referred to as the
“protected activities.”) The bounty provision provides that:
[i]n any covered judicial or administrative action, or related
action, the [SEC], under regulations prescribed by the [SEC]
and subject to subsection (c), shall pay an award or awards to 1
or more whistleblowers who voluntarily provide original
information to the [SEC] that led to the successful enforcement
of the covered judicial or administrative action, or related
action, in an aggregate amount equal to—
(A) not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action
or related actions; and
(B) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action
or related actions.95

To ensure its purpose under the Whistleblower Program was
achieved, Congress authorized the SEC to establish rules and
regulations to implement the Whistleblower Program.96 As such, to
assist in its administration of the Whistleblower Program, the SEC
established the OWB.97
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2014).
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2014).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2014).
2014 Annual Report, supra note 60.
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B. SEC’s Rule
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under the Dodd-Frank
Act,98 the SEC issued Rule 21F-2(b), which provides in part:
(1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by
[the anti-retaliation provision], you are a whistleblower if: . . .
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are
providing relates to a possible securities law violation . . . that
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, and;
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in
[subsections (i)-(iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected
activities].
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you
satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify
for an award.99

In issuing its Rule, the SEC sought to clarify an ambiguity in
the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation provision by directly stating
that anti-retaliation protection extends to an individual who
engages in whistleblowing activity described in subsection (iii) of
the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities regardless of
whether the individual also makes an external report to the SEC.100

C.

Root of the Problem: How to Interpret Subsection (iii) of the
Anti-Retaliation Provision’s Protected Activities

Conflict exists among the SEC, various district courts, and the
Second and Fifth Circuits as to whether subsection (iii) of the antiretaliation provision’s protected activities affords an exception to
the whistleblower definition. The conflict arises because the DoddFrank Act seems to create a “two-tiered structure of [antiretaliation] protection[] where potential whistleblowers receive
different sets of protections depending on whether they choose to
report internally or externally.”101 For example, if an employeewhistleblower makes an external report of misconduct to the SEC,
then the employee-whistleblower is protected under subsection (i)
of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities since the

98. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j).
99. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b) (West 2015), invalidated by Asadi v. G.E. Energy
(USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
100. Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 1.
101. See Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17, at 1834.
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disclosure was made directly to the SEC.102 If that same employeewhistleblower only makes an internal report through his
employer’s internal procedures, then that employee-whistleblower
may not be protected under the anti-retaliation provision, unless
the employee-whistleblower’s disclosure is protected under
subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected
activities.103
The question becomes: what type of anti-retaliation protection
does subsection (iii) provide to an employee-whistleblower who
makes an internal report to his employer pursuant to SOX, if SOX
requires companies to establish policies and procedures for internal
employee disclosures of misconduct?104 This question illustrates
the ambiguity that arises between the whistleblower definition,
which specifically states that in order to be a whistleblower
disclosure needs to be made to the SEC,105 and subsection (iii) of
the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities, which
contemplates disclosures made pursuant to SOX.106 The same
ambiguity arises if the employee-whistleblower makes an internal
report through his employer’s procedures and also makes a
concurrent disclosure to the SEC, of which the employer is
unaware.107
1.

Minority View: The Anti-Retaliation Provision is
Unambiguous and Requires Reporting to the SEC to
Receive Protection

The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit court of appeals to weigh
in on this issue. In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., the Fifth
Circuit held that the whistleblower definition is unambiguous and
requires an individual to make a report to the SEC in order to
qualify as a whistleblower and receive protection under the antiretaliation provision.108 Along with the Fifth Circuit, five district
courts—in California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, and
Wisconsin—have also determined that the anti-retaliation
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B) (2014).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2014).
107. “[T]his potential circumvention of internal reporting could have vast costs
and indeed could undermine the very goal that [the Whistleblower Program] was
enacted to promote–the effective and efficient detection of securities law violations.”
Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17, at 1835.
108. 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2013).
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provision is unambiguous and requires reporting to the SEC.109
In making its determination, the minority of courts have relied
on the principles of statutory construction.110 When issues of
statutory construction arise, there is a series of steps that a court
should take to determine the meaning of a statute.111 Step one is to
determine if the statutory language is ambiguous.112 If the statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, the statute must be applied
according to its terms.113 “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory
language is determined by reference to the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole.”114 In construing the statutory
language, a court should give effect to every word and provision,
when possible, and interpret provisions in a manner that renders
them compatible and not contradictory.115 “If the statutory text is
unambiguous, the inquiry begins and ends with the text.”116
If the statute is ambiguous, step two in the analysis is to
determine if the agency’s interpretation warrants judicial
deference.117 In making this determination, a court must apply
another two-step process established in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.118 The first step of the
109. Lutzeier v. Citigroup Inc., 305 F.R.D. 107, 110 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (stating that
the plain language of the anti-retaliation provision demonstrates a whistleblower must
report to the SEC to qualify for protection); Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F.
Supp. 3d 640, 646 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (stating that the plain language of Congress should
be given full effect); Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014
WL 2619501, at *1, *7 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014) (stating that Congress intended
whistleblower protection to apply only to an individual who meets the whistleblower
definition); Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (stating that
the Whistleblower Program is unambiguous and only available to an individual who
meets the whistleblower definition); Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00381RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *1, *5 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013) (stating that the third
protected activity described in the anti-retaliation provision only applies to a
whistleblower as defined in the whistleblower definition).
110. Lutzeier, 305 F.R.D. at 110 (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning);
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623 (explaining statutory construction analysis by the court);
Englehart, 2014 WL 2619501, at *7–*8 (explaining statutory construction analysis);
Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 755–758 (applying rules of statutory construction); Wagner,
2013 WL 3786643, at *4 (stating claim fails as a matter of statutory construction).
111. Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 755.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citation omitted).
114. Id. (citation omitted).
115. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 622 (citation omitted).
116. Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 755 (citation omitted).
117. Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
118. Id.; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
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Chevron analysis is to inquire as to whether Congress has spoken
directly on the issue.119 If Congress’s intent is clear, then a court
and the agency must give effect to the express intent of Congress.120
However, if Congress has not directly spoken on the issue, then the
second step is to determine whether the agency’s interpretation is a
permissible construction of the statute.121 “If the agency[’s]
interpretation is reasonable, then [a court] must defer to it.”122
Thus, if ambiguity exists between Congress’s definition of
whistleblower and subsection (iii) of the protected activities, and
the SEC’s Rule is a reasonable interpretation, then the SEC’s Rule
should stand.
Applying these principles, the Fifth Circuit determined that its
analysis ended with the statute.123 A whistleblower is defined as
“any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation
of the securities laws to the [SEC], in a manner established, by rule
or regulation, by the [SEC].”124 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
the whistleblower definition, on its own, is unambiguous and
requires that an individual make a report to the SEC in order to
qualify as a whistleblower.125
(1984). In Chevron, the Supreme Court considered whether the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) regulation using the bubble concept was based on a
reasonable construction of the term “stationary source” as used in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977 (the “Clean Air Act”). Id. at 840. The Supreme Court reversed
on the grounds that the court of appeals misconstrued the nature of its role in
reviewing the regulation. Id. at 841–45, 865. Using the principles of statutory
construction, the Supreme Court determined that the Clean Air Act did not reference
the bubble concept, nor did it contain a specific definition of stationary source. Id. at
842–45. Since Congress did not specifically speak to the issue, the Supreme Court next
reviewed the legislative history, which also did not specifically address the issue. Id. at
851. The Supreme Court then turned to the EPA’s regulation stating that as long as it
was a reasonable interpretation of Congress’s mandate, then the regulation was entitled
to deference. Id. at 865. “[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.” Id. Thus,
the Supreme Court held that the EPA’s use of the bubble concept was a permissible
construction of the statute and should be given deference. Id. at 865–66.
119. Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Kar Onn Lee v. Holder, 701 F.3d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 2012)
(second alteration in original)). The Supreme Court has “long recognized that
considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle[s] of deference to
administrative interpretations.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
123. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013).
124. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014).
125. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623.
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Asadi conceded that he did not qualify as a whistleblower
under the whistleblower definition because he did not provide
information to the SEC.126 Instead, he argued that subsection (iii)
of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities should be
construed to protect an individual who makes an internal disclosure
to his employer, even if the individual does not also report to the
SEC, because there is a conflict between the whistleblower
definition and subsection (iii).127 However, the Fifth Circuit stated
that this perceived conflict rested on a misreading of the
Whistleblower Program.128
The Fifth Circuit explained that there is only one category of
whistleblower: an “individual[] who provide[s] information relating
to a securities law violation to the SEC;”129 whereas the protected
activities listed in the anti-retaliation provision represent
whistleblower protection claims.130 The Fifth Circuit stated that the
text of these three protected activities is unambiguous and, as such,
subsection (iii) protects a whistleblower who makes a “disclosure[]
that [is] required or protected under [SOX and] any [other] law,
rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.”131
Asadi stated he was not arguing that the language of
subsection (iii) itself was ambiguous, but that subsection (iii)
conflicts with the whistleblower definition.132 He reasoned that an
individual could make a disclosure that falls within subsection (iii),
but if the individual does not also make a report to the SEC, he
would not be considered a whistleblower under the whistleblower
definition.133 Asadi argued that such a reading of the antiretaliation provision would make subsection (iii) superfluous.134
The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument stating that there
would only be a conflict if the three categories of protected
activities outlined in subsection (iii) were read as additional
definitions of the term “whistleblower.”135 The Fifth Circuit stated
that such a construction of the anti-retaliation provision was not

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 624.
Id.
Id. at 625.
Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014).
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 625.
Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2014).
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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supported by the structure of the Whistleblower Program.136
Congress specifically used the term “whistleblower” in the antiretaliation provision rather than the terms “individual” or
“employee.”137
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that, since the
whistleblower definition clearly defines who qualifies as a
whistleblower, the definition must be given effect and there can be
no alternative definitions.138
The Fifth Circuit also stated that the interplay between the
whistleblower definition and subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation
provision’s protected activities does not render subsection (iii)
superfluous.139 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that subsection (iii)
“protects whistleblowers from retaliation, based not on the
individual’s disclosure of information to the SEC but, instead, on
that individual’s other possible required or protected
disclosure(s).”140
To illustrate this point, the Fifth Circuit provided the following
hypothetical:
Assume a mid-level manager discovers a securities law
violation. On the day he makes this discovery, he immediately
reports this securities law violation (1) to his company’s chief
executive officer (“CEO”) and (2) to the SEC. Unfortunately
for the mid-level manager, the CEO, who is not yet aware of
the disclosure to the SEC, immediately fires the mid-level
manager. The mid-level manager, clearly a “whistleblower” as
defined in Dodd-Frank because he provided information to the
SEC relating to a securities law violation, would be unable to
prove that he was retaliated against because of the report to the
SEC. Accordingly, the first and second category of protected
activity would not shield this whistleblower from retaliation.
The third category of protected activity, however, protects the
mid-level manager. In this scenario, the internal disclosure to
the CEO, a person with supervisory authority over the midlevel manager, is protected under . . . [SOX]. Accordingly, even
though the CEO was not aware of the report to the SEC at the
time he terminated the mid-level manager, the mid-level
136. Id.
137. Id. The anti-retaliation provision provides that “[n]o employer may
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other
manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A) (2014) (emphasis added).
138. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626–27.
139. Id. at 627.
140. Id.
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manager can state a claim under the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower-protection provision because he was a
“whistleblower” and suffered retaliation based on his disclosure
to the CEO, which was protected under SOX.141

The Fifth Circuit reasoned this hypothetical demonstrates that
subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected
activities is not superfluous.142
Subsection (iii) protects an
individual from retaliation who qualifies as a whistleblower under
the whistleblower definition based on his other required or
protected disclosure.143 The Fifth Circuit stated that Asadi’s
construction would read the words “to the [SEC]” out of the
whistleblower definition and violate the principles of statutory
construction that every word must be given effect.144
Finally, Asadi argued that the Fifth Circuit should defer to the
SEC’s Rule, which extends anti-retaliation protection to an
individual who provides information in accordance with the antiretaliation provision.145 However, the Fifth Circuit rejected this
argument as well, stating that the SEC’s Rule redefines
whistleblower more broadly than Congress intended.146 The SEC’s
Rule provides that an individual can qualify as a whistleblower
even though the individual does not make a disclosure to the SEC
as long as the individual is engaged in one of the three protected
activities listed in the anti-retaliation provision.147 The Fifth Circuit
stated that the plain language of the Whistleblower Program does
not support the SEC’s expanded definition of whistleblower since
Congress unambiguously defined the term “whistleblower.”148
The Whistleblower Program clearly expresses Congress’s
intent that, to qualify as a whistleblower under the Dodd-Frank
Act, an individual must make a disclosure to the SEC.149 Since
Congress directly addressed who qualifies as a whistleblower, the
Fifth Circuit determined that it must reject the SEC’s Rule
expanding the definition of whistleblower.150 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit held that the anti-retaliation provision only provides
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id. at 629–30.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
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retaliation protection to an employee-whistleblower who makes a
disclosure to the SEC.151
Furthering the argument that, in order to receive protection
under the anti-retaliation provision an individual must first qualify
as a whistleblower under the whistleblower definition, the district
courts in California and Florida looked at the anti-retaliation
provision’s section heading—”Protection of Whistleblowers.”152
These district courts acknowledged that while a section heading
“cannot limit the plain meaning of the text,” the section heading
could lend support to the conclusion that the anti-retaliation
provision only protects an individual who qualifies as a
whistleblower under the whistleblower definition.153
2. Majority View: The Anti-Retaliation Provision is
Ambiguous and Should be Construed to Also Protect
Employee-Whistleblowers Who Only Make Internal
Reports
In deciding whether subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation
provision’s protected activities is intended to also protect an
employee-whistleblower who makes only an internal report to his
employer, the Second Circuit and majority of district courts take
one of two approaches. The Second Circuit and district courts in
California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York
utilize the first approach, the Chevron154 deference test,155 which is
151. Id.
152. Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL
2619501, at *1, *8 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014); Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749,
757 (N.D. Cal. 2013); see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2014).
153. Englehart, 2014 WL 2619501, at *8 (quoting Florida Dep’t of Revenue v.
Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008)); Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 757.
154. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
155. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *9 (2d
Cir. Sept. 10, 2015) (stating that the court need not resolve the ambiguity itself and will
defer to the SEC’s reasonable interpretation); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., No. C14-5180 EMC, 2015 WL 4483955, at *1, *12 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2015) (finding that the
SEC’s Rule is a reasonable interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision and entitled
to deference); Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 WL 5473144, at *1,
*6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (finding that the whistleblower definition is ambiguous and
the SEC’s Rule is reasonable and warrants deference); Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc.,
18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that the whistleblower definition and
the anti-retaliation provision, when read in conjunction with each other, create a
potential conflict and the SEC’s Rule is a reasonable reading that resolves the
ambiguity); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 (SDW)(MCA), slip
op. 1, 6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014) (giving deference to the SEC’s Rule since it “harmonizes
the contradictory provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act while not rendering any word or
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the same approach used by the Fifth Circuit and the minority of
courts.156 Under this approach, if there is ambiguity between the
whistleblower definition and subsection (iii), and the SEC’s Rule is
a reasonable interpretation, a court must defer to it.157 Under the
second approach, district courts in Colorado, Nebraska, New York,
and Tennessee have determined that, by its own terms, subsection
(iii) does not require interaction directly with the SEC and
provides retaliation protection to an employee-whistleblower who
makes an internal disclosure required or protected by certain laws
within the SEC’s jurisdiction.158
a.

First approach: Chevron deference

The first step of the Chevron deference test is to determine if
the Whistleblower Program is ambiguous.159 According to its
terms, subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision prohibits an
section superfluous”); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d
141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (giving the SEC’s Rule deference since the Whistleblower
Program is ambiguous and there is conflict in a narrow reading requiring disclosure to
the SEC when read in conjunction with subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision,
which does not require reporting to the SEC); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp.
2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013) (adopting the SEC’s interpretation of the Whistleblower
Program to provide anti-retaliation protection to an individual who only makes an
internal report); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084,
at *1, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (deferring to the SEC’s interpretation because the
SEC’s Rule clarifies an ambiguity in the Whistleblower Program); Kramer v. TransLux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820, at *1, *4–*5 (D. Conn. Sept. 25,
2012) (finding that the Whistleblower Program is ambiguous and the SEC’s Rule
should be given deference since it is a reasonable interpretation). See supra Part II.C.1
and text accompanying notes 110–122 for a discussion of statutory construction and the
Chevron deference two-step analysis.
156. See supra Part II.C.1.
157. Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. at 147–48.
158. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 732–33 (D. Neb. 2014)
(declining to give the SEC’s Rule deference, since a plain reading of the Whistleblower
Provision shows that an internal reporter is also protected under the anti-retaliation
provision, even though the internal reporter would not qualify for a bounty under the
bounty provision); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013)
(stating that there is conflict between the whistleblower definition and the third
subsection of the anti-retaliation provision and that the third subsection should be read
as an exception to the whistleblower definition); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc.,
852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (harmonizing the whistleblower definition
and the third subsection of protected activity in the anti-retaliation provision to
demonstrate that an internal reporter is protected so long as the disclosure relates to a
violation of the securities laws); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS),
2011 WL 1672066, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (contradicting provisions of the
Whistleblower Program are best read so that subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation
provision is an exception to the whistleblower definition).
159. Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755 (N.D. Cal. 2013). See supra
Part II.C.1 for an expanded explanation of the Chevron deference test.
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employer from retaliating against a whistleblower for taking certain
protected actions under SOX, which does not require disclosure to
the SEC,160 while whistleblower is defined as an individual who
reports a securities law violation to the SEC.161 Based on a reading
of these provisions, ambiguity arises as subsection (iii)
“contemplates a broader scope of protection.”162
Courts utilizing the Chevron deference approach acknowledge
that the Fifth Circuit has read these provisions as the whistleblower
definition defining who is protected and subsections (i)-(iii) of the
anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities as identifying what a
whistleblower is protected from doing.163 However, while “this
reading of the two statutory provisions is permissible . . . it is by no
means mandatory.”164
These courts have determined that
subsection (iii) can also be viewed as an exception to the
whistleblower definition.165 The existence of these “competing,
plausible interpretations . . . compels the conclusion that the
statutory text is ambiguous in conveying Congress’s intent.”166
Thus, when the whistleblower definition is read alongside
subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected
activities, there is ambiguity regarding who subsection (iii)
protects.167
The second step of the Chevron deference test is to apply the
Chevron deference two-step analysis. First, a court must consider
whether Congress has spoken directly on the issue, and if so, must
give effect to Congress’ expressed intent.168 However, if Congress
is silent on the specific issue, then a court must determine if the
agency’s interpretation is a “permissible construction of the
statute”.169 If the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, a court

160. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2014). One provision of SOX requires
companies to establish policies and procedures for an employee to anonymously
disclose instances of misconduct to the board of directors. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78j1(m)(4)(B) (2014); Baynes, supra note 44, at 877–880.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014).
162. Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at
*1,*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
163. Id.
164. Id. at *5.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citation omitted).
167. Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
168. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., No. C-14-5180 EMC, 2015 WL 4483955, at
*1, *5 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2015); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F.
Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
169. Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *5 (citation omitted); Rosenblum, 984 F.
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must defer to it and cannot substitute its own interpretation of the
statute, even if the court believes a different reading is necessary.170
In applying the first step of the Chevron deference two-step
analysis, a review of the legislative history indicates that subsection
(iii) of the anti-retaliation provision was only added to the last
version of the Dodd-Frank Act that was passed and there is no
record that Congress even discussed subsection (iii) during its
sessions.171 Therefore, since Congress has not spoken on the issue
and its intent cannot be discerned, step two of the Chevron
deference two-step analysis requires a court to defer to the SEC’s
Rule as long as it is a reasonable construction.
The SEC’s Rule is in line with two cardinal rules of statutory
construction.172 First, the SEC’s Rule is consistent with the
superfluous cannon that a statute ought to be construed so that “no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.”173
Second, the Rule is consistent with the
harmonious-reading cannon that a court should “interpret [a]
statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if
possible, all parts into a harmonious whole.”174 While a statutory
definition is a strong indicator of a term’s defined meaning, the
definition can be contradicted by other indications.175 In fact, a
recent Supreme Court case reasoned that, in determining the fair
reading of a statute, a general definition does not necessarily
constituted a clear statement of what Congress meant and other
factors can be considered in order to harmonize the meaning of a
statute.176
Supp. 2d at 147 (citation omitted).
170. Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *5; Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
171. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *7 (2d
Cir. Sept. 10, 2015); Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *11.
172. Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *6.
173. Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *1,
*5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2014) (citation omitted); Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *6.
174. Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *6 (citation omitted).
175. Berman, 2015 WL 5254916, at *8; Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *7.
176. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090–91 (2014). Bond discovered
that her best friend was pregnant with her husband’s child. Id. at 2085. Bond, seeking
revenge on her friend, ordered two toxic chemicals on Amazon.com. Id. On over 20
different occasions, Bond spread the chemicals on her friend’s car door, mailbox, and
doorknob. Id. On one occasion, her friend came in contact with the chemicals, which
resulted in a minor burn on her friend’s thumb that was easily treated by rinsing it with
water. Id. Bond was charged with two counts of possessing and using a chemical
weapon under the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (the
“Act”). Id. at 2083, 2085. She entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to
six years in federal prison, five years of supervised released, and ordered to pay a
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Tension arises since the whistleblower definition requires an
individual to provide information to the SEC177 and subsection (iii)
of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities provides
protection to an individual who makes a SOX disclosure that is not
required to be reported to the SEC.178 In its comments to its Rule,
the SEC explained that the anti-retaliation provision protects
“three different categories of whistleblowers, and the third
category . . . includes individuals who report to persons and
governmental authorities other than the [SEC].”179 Accordingly,
the SEC recognizes subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation
provision’s protected activities as an exception to the whistleblower
definition and affords retaliation protection to employeewhistleblowers who make internal disclosures to their employers.180
In promulgating its Rule, the “SEC considered the policy issues
involved and exercised judgment in formulating its final rule” the
purpose of which was to “better achieve the goals of the
[Whistleblower Program] and advance effective enforcement of the
Federal securities laws.”181 The SEC’s Rule clarifies an ambiguity
in a statute in which the SEC was charged with promulgating rules
in order to interpret and enforce the statute.182 Further, the SEC
has experience and expertise, acquired over time, in interpreting
and enforcing securities laws.183 Therefore, a court should defer to
the SEC’s reasonable interpretation of the Whistleblower
$2,000 fine and almost $10,000 in restitution. Id. at 2086. The Tenth Circuit affirmed
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. The Supreme Court reserved Bond’s
conviction and remanded in part because the defined term “chemical weapon” was
being too broadly interpreted and intruded on the States’ police power. Id. at 2090,
2094. The Supreme Court gave the example that, if placed in the city’s water supply,
the chemicals Bond used may be considered chemical weapons; however, Bond’s
actions were much less severe and allowing a conviction under the Act would give the
statute a reach that exceeded the ordinary meaning of the words Congress used. Id. at
2091.
177. Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *7; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014).
178. Somers, 2015 WL 2354807, at *7; see supra note 159 and accompanying text.
179. Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
180. Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *1,
*5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
181. Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
182. Id. at *7. In fact, “the SEC is clearly the agency to resolve the ambiguity we
face.” Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *9 (2d Cir.
Sept. 10, 2015).
183. Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *7. The Supreme Court has “long recognized
that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to
administrative interpretations.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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Program.184
b.

Second approach: on its face, the anti-retaliation provision
protects employee-whistleblowers

District courts in Colorado, Nebraska, New York, and
Tennessee utilize the second approach and have determined that,
by their own terms, subsections (i) and (ii) of the anti-retaliation
provision’s protected activities provide protection to an individual
who makes a report to the SEC or who works with the SEC
concerning potential securities law violations.185 On the other
hand, subsection (iii) does not require interaction directly with the
SEC and provides protection for an employee-whistleblower who
makes disclosures required under SOX or pursuant to another rule
or regulation subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction.186
Simply put, if an employee was required to report a potential
securities law violation through his employer’s internal
whistleblowing procedures or an employee’s disclosure was
protected by another federal agency or by federal law enforcement,
then subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected
activities would prohibit retaliation against that employeewhistleblower by his employer.187 In this respect, subsection (iii) is
seen as a catch-all provision to extend retaliation protection to an
employee-whistleblower who makes a disclosure under any law,
rule, or regulation that is subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction.188
Further, under traditional statutory construction principles, a
court must give reasonable meaning to the words of a statute
without rendering any language superfluous.189 By reading the
whistleblower definition, which requires reporting to the SEC,
verbatim, it “would effectively invalidate [subsection] (iii)’s
protection of whistleblower disclosures that do not require
reporting to the SEC.”190 Therefore, a court must read subsection
(iii) together with the whistleblower definition to protect an
employee-whistleblower who reports a possible securities law
violation internally to his employer or externally to non-SEC
184. Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *5, *7.
185. Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (M.D. Tenn.
2012).
186. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2014).
187. Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citation omitted).
190. Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at
*1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
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persons.191
c.

SEC’s Amicus Curiae Briefs

The SEC has submitted amicus curiae briefs in Second Circuit
and Third Circuit cases to support its interpretation of the antiretaliation provision.192 In its briefs, the SEC recognized that there
is ambiguity between subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation
provision’s
protected
activities,
which
lists
protected
whistleblowing activities that do not require reporting to the SEC
(by referring to SOX and other non-SEC originated rules that are
also subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction), and the whistleblower
definition.193 A whistleblower is an “individual who provides . . .
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
[SEC], in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
[SEC].”194 The SEC noted that subsections (i) and (ii) of the antiretaliation provision’s protected activities protect whistleblowers
who report information directly to the SEC or participate with the
SEC in an investigation, whereas subsection (iii) goes beyond
disclosures involving securities law violations and disclosure made
to the SEC.195
The SEC acknowledged that if the whistleblower definition
was read narrowly as a limitation on the application of subsection
(iii), then two preconditions would need to be met in order for a
whistleblower to be protected under subsection (iii): first, the
whistleblower made a concurrent disclosure to the SEC, and
second, the information involved a violation of the securities
laws.196 The SEC questioned this reading because “[i]f Congress
had actually intended to protect only these ‘required or protected’

191. Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
192. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 1; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 31, at 1; see
supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text for background on the Second Circuit and
Third Circuit cases.
193. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 18, Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 18–20.
As written, subsection (iii) also provides protection to an employee who makes a
disclosure to a public company audit committee regarding questionable accounting
practices, which includes practices that may not rise to the level of a securities law
violation, and an in-house attorney’s duty under SOX to disclose a breach of the Chief
Executive Officer’s fiduciary duty. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 19.
194. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 18; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 18–20;
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014).
195. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 19; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 18–20;
see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2014); see also supra note 193 and accompanying
text.
196. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 20.
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disclosures that satisfy these two conditions, why would Congress
craft [subsection] (iii) to unnecessarily suggest that it protects a
much broader class of disclosures than it actually does?”197 If
Congress truly intended this outcome, it could have been more
explicit that subsection (iii) only intended to protect disclosures of
securities law violations and only if the whistleblower made a
concurrent disclosure to the SEC.198 Furthermore, subsection (iii)
would be redundant in instances where the employer knows the
whistleblower also made a concurrent disclosure to the SEC as
subsections (i) and (ii) would already provide retaliation protection
for the whistleblower who reports securities law violations to the
SEC.199
The only other instance in which this construction of
subsection (iii) may function is under the hypothetical posed by the
Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.200 While the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that this hypothetical prevents subsection
(iii) from being superfluous, that is far from true.201 The SEC
stated that the anti-retaliation provision is intended to prevent
retaliation by putting an employer on notice that it cannot retaliate
against its employees.202 By following the Fifth Circuit’s approach,
subsection (iii) would be ineffective to prevent retaliation and
would lose its deterrent effect on employers because an employer
would not know that the employee-whistleblower made an external
report to the SEC.203
The interplay between the statutory provisions demonstrates
that Congress did not unambiguously express its intent to limit the
protections contained in the anti-retaliation provision to only
whistleblowers who report securities law violations to the SEC.204
By reaching the contrary conclusion, the Fifth Circuit failed to
consider the role the Whistleblower Program “occupies within the
broader securities-law framework, particularly the internal
reporting processes that Congress has previously established,”205
197. Id.
198. Id. at 20–21.
199. Id. at 21; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 20–21.
200. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 22; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 22;
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2013). See supra p.
21–22 for the text of the hypothetical posed by the Fifth Circuit in Asadi.
201. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 22.
202. Id.; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 22.
203. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 22; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 22–23.
204. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 23.
205. Id. at 24.
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whereas the SEC acknowledges and interprets the Whistleblower
Program against the broader securities-law framework.206
Further, the SEC acknowledged the Fifth Circuit’s erroneous
belief that its interpretation was necessary in order to avoid
abolishing SOX whistleblower protection because it was unlikely a
whistleblower would raise a SOX anti-retaliation claim if the
whistleblower could raise a Dodd-Frank Act anti-retaliation
claim.207 However, this ignores two advantages of a SOX antiretaliation claim.208 First, an individual could avoid the burdens of
pursuing his claim in court, which would likely result in high
litigation costs, having his claim heard in an administrative forum,
and having the DoL assume responsibility for the investigation.209
Second, an individual with nominal back pay damages but
significant emotional injuries may receive an even greater recovery,
because a SOX claim allows recovery for emotional distress and
reputational harm.210 These advantages demonstrate that SOX
anti-retaliation protection is not effectively abolished by the SEC’s
interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation provision.
Since there is ambiguity between the whistleblower definition
and subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision, the SEC’s
reasonable interpretation that the anti-retaliation provision
protects three different types of protected activities and that
subsection (iii) protects an employee-whistleblower who reports to
someone other than to the SEC warrants deference.211 The SEC
stated that its interpretation is reasonable since “[a] contrary result
. . . would significantly weaken the deterrence effect on employers
who might otherwise consider taking an adverse employment
action.”212 Further, its interpretation is reasonable because it
resolves the statutory ambiguity in a way that provides broad
retaliation protection in the manner the anti-retaliation provision
contemplated; ensures an employee-whistleblower who reports
internally first will not be disadvantaged by losing employment
retaliation protection; and better supports the overall objective of
206. Id.
207. Id.; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 20. A Dodd-Frank Act antiretaliation claim allows for recovery of two times back pay rather than only back pay
under a SOX anti-retaliation claim and has a substantially longer statute of limitations.
Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 24.
208. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 25.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 26; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 27–28.
212. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 29; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 29.

32

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

the Whistleblower Program and the SEC’s rulemaking—mainly,
not to dis-incentivize a potential employee-whistleblower from first
making an internal report.213
III. CONFIDENTIALITY AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS,
COMPANY SELF-REPORTING, EMPLOYEE LOYALTY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY: CONSIDERATIONS AND BENEFITS
A. Confidentiality and Ethical Considerations of Corporate
Officers and Employees Holding Professional Designations
Corporate officers and corporate accounting and finance
employees, such as certified public accountants (“CPAs”) and
chartered financial analysts (“CFAs”), have an advantage over
regulators in monitoring a company’s compliance with the
securities laws as these employees have access to confidential and
proprietary company information and have the requisite
knowledge of the company and its methods of conducting
business.214 These employees have the technical skills necessary to
understand the complex financial transactions and a unique ability
to recognize when corporate actions violate the securities laws.215
In addition, such employees are agents for the companies in which
they work and owe certain fiduciary duties to the company.216
Corporate officers and corporate accounting and finance
employees owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their respective
employers, must act in good faith, must act in the best interests of
their employer, and must protect company information.217
Additionally, CPAs and CFAs are part of professional
organizations that require their members to adhere to certain
confidentiality and ethical obligations, including the obligation to
act in the best interests of their employer and/or client.218 Such
confidentiality and ethical obligations can, by their very nature,

213. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 28; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 28–29.
214. Moberly, supra note 45, at 1116–17; Baynes, supra note 44, at 884.
215. Moberly, supra note 45, at 1116–17; Rapp, supra note 46, at 109.
216. Baynes, supra note 44. Officers and senior executives owe a duty of loyalty
and a duty of care to their employer. Id. at 883–86. The duty of loyalty involves acting
in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the
company, which includes protecting company information. Id. at 883. The duty of care
involves performing duties with the care that a person in a similar “position would
reasonably exercise under similar circumstances.” Id. at 886.
217. Id. at 883.
218. See Code of Ethics & Standards of Professional Conduct, supra note 44;
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 44.
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conflict with internal whistleblowing policies and procedures and
external whistleblowing programs.219
These employees may be found to have converted company
information by sharing such information with external
authorities.220 At worst, these external disclosures could lead to
civil or criminal liability for the company, senior officers, and the
board of directors, and may make it impossible for them to receive
reduced sanctions and fines.221 At the very least, these external
disclosures could lead to embarrassment or reputational loss for the
company and the corporate officers.222
CFAs have similar difficulties. If a CFA discovers that his
company or another employee has committed a securities law
violation, the CFA has a duty not to participate or assist in the
misconduct and to act in the best interest of his client/employer,
which may include disclosing the misconduct in order to prevent
further harm.223 The CFA may have an inherent conflict with his
ethical obligations if he fears retaliation by his employer for
reporting the possible violation internally through his employer’s
whistleblowing procedures and chooses to report the possible
violation externally to the SEC.224
The CFA Institute has enumerated certain steps a CFA should
take in order to avoid ethical violations and stop misconduct from
occurring or continuing to occur.225 These steps include discussing
concerns with the individual committing the misconduct to allow
the individual time to correct the situation; notifying the employer
through the employer’s internal procedures; asking to be removed
from the situation where the misconduct is occurring; reporting the
misconduct to the appropriate outside regulator; and resigning
from the company if continued employment might be construed as
participation in the misconduct.226 While these steps may assist a
CFA in avoiding disciplinary actions initiated by the CFA Institute,
they do nothing to protect a CFA from retaliation by his employer
for reporting a violation internally. In fact, the CFA Institute
219. See Baynes, supra note 44, at 885.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 886.
223. See Code of Ethics & Standards of Professional Conduct, supra note 44;
What Makes a True CFA Charterholder, CFA MAG. 34 (Jan.–Feb. 2011),
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/cfm.v22.n1.full.
224. What Makes a True CFA Charterholder, supra note 223.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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encourages a CFA to take actions (e.g., making an internal report)
that potentially may not be protected under the Fifth Circuit’s
reading of the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation provision.
Under the Fifth Circuit’s reading, if a CFA made an internal
report of a possible securities law violation to his employer and his
employer retaliated against him for that internal report, the CFA
would not be protected under subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation
provision.227 According to the Fifth Circuit, the CFA would not be
considered a whistleblower under the whistleblower definition
because he did not make his report to the SEC.228 Thus, any
retaliation faced by the CFA by virtue of his internal disclosure
would go unpunished, even if the CFA subsequently made a report
to the SEC.229 At the time of future disclosure to the SEC,
retaliation against the CFA would have already occurred. Since
that retaliation did not occur as a result of the CFA’s disclosure to
the SEC, the CFA would not be protected under the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision. If the employer
retaliated against the CFA for a second time, as a result of the
CFA’s external report to the SEC, only then would the CFA have
any protection from retaliation under the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation and that protection would be limited to the
retaliation directly resulting from the CFA’s disclosure to the SEC.
Such an outcome has a chilling effect on those employees who
are charged with independently confirming their employer’s
compliance with the securities laws.
The Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation provides timid anti-retaliation protection that may
come too late in many instances. It may even encourage retaliation
against employee-whistleblowers who only make internal reports in
the first instance, because any retaliation by the employer against
these employee-whistleblowers would not be subject to the antiretaliation provision’s protection.
B. Company Incentives to Self-Report Violations
As regulators’ primary focus has shifted away from
punishment of a company towards the cessation of wrongdoing,

227. See supra Part II.C.1.
228. See supra Part II.C.1.
229. The CFA’s delay in reporting the potential securities law violation to the
SEC is a direct consequence of the CFA Institute’s enumerated steps to avoid ethical
violations and disciplinary actions initiated by the CFA Institute. See What Makes a
True CFA Charterholder, supra note 223.
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public support of internal whistleblowing has grown.230
Whistleblowing has been embraced as a “tool to reduce, deter and
stop corporate wrongdoing.”231 Regulators often “enlist private
corporations to self-regulate actively by self-identifying problems
and risks.”232 New regulations rely on individual companies to
monitor their compliance with the securities laws and to
continuously learn about industry best practices.233
These new regulations and “judicial decisions . . . encourage
employers to establish internal whistleblowing procedures in order
to reap the benefits that these reports can deliver to organizations
and the government. Direct incentives for creating internal
[whistleblowing] procedures are included in congressional
mandates such as the federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines.”234
The Corporate Sentencing Guidelines specifically recommend
internal whistleblowing as a way to deter misconduct by providing
for increased monetary fines and sanctions for companies that
make little to no effort to prevent wrongdoing.235 Companies that,
in good faith, attempt to stop and detect misconduct often receive
reduced fines and sanctions.236 Meaningful internal reporting
systems and protecting whistleblowers are some of the
characteristics of an acceptable detection program.237 These
internal reporting systems allow for early detection of issues and
give the company time to respond before misconduct can fester and
expose the company to substantial liabilities.238
Internal reporting saves public funds by reducing the costs
associated with investigations and enforcement actions initiated by
the SEC, other regulatory agencies, and law enforcement; is in line
with most employees’ preference to internally report possible
violations; is less harmful to the company; and is seen as more
ethical as external reporting is often perceived as disloyal.239
230. Dworkin, supra note 42.
231. Callahan et al., supra note 41, at 215.
232. Lobel, supra note 43, at 1247.
233. Id. at 1248.
234. Callahan et al., supra note 41, at 190.
235. Id. at 191.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Letter from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President and Gen. Couns., Ass’n
of Corp. Couns., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-126.pdf [http://perma.cc/TLK9-XFWQ].
239. Dworkin, supra note 42; Bishara, et al., supra note 40, at 39. “Governments,
strapped for resources, facing shrinking budgets, global competitive pressures to
liberalize trade, and corporate regulatory resistance, are increasingly experimenting
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Internal whistleblowing procedures provide an efficient and
inexpensive source of information on possible corporate
misconduct; assist in communicating information to those who have
the power to act; and assist in correcting “misunderstandings and
wrongdoing without the financial and reputational risks associated
with external” whistleblowing.240
The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the anti-retaliation
provision241 would frustrate these company incentives and conflict
with other statutes and regulations, such as SOX, which encourages
internal reporting because employee-whistleblowers would be
forced to simultaneously report possible misconduct to the SEC to
preserve protection under the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation
provision. If this were to happen, company whistleblowing
procedures would be meaningless and most likely go unused.
Additionally, companies would not receive the benefits associated
with early detection of potential misconduct, resulting in more
harm to the company, its clients, and investors.
C. Employee Whistleblowing and Loyalty
Whistleblowers are rarely seen in a positive light. In fact,
“[t]he history of whistleblowers[]. . . [is that most] have been fired,
blackballed from their industry or profession, and have suffered
personal problems.”242
Fellow employees generally view
whistleblowers as disloyal and treat them as outcasts.243
Nevertheless, “a deep sense of institutional loyalty (as well as fear
of retribution for blowing the whistle) lies within the heart of most
employees . . . .”244
The regulatory environment is based on the assumption that
regulators will detect instances of misconduct.245 However, a study
of corporate scandals found that the SEC detected only seven
with approaches that rely on organizations themselves to complement standard-setting
and enforcement activities.” Lobel, supra note 43, at 1267.
240. Bishara, et al., supra note 40. “External whistleblowers can disclose
confidential information or inaccurate information that hurts the company’s business.”
Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate
Governance Provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 22 (2007).
241. See supra Part III.C.1.
242. David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heros? Towards a
Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 109, 113 (1995) (all but first alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
243. Id. at 114.
244. Id. at 115.
245. Rapp, supra note 46, at 109.
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percent of the corporate fraud.246
This suggests that
“[w]histleblowing is the single most effective way to detect fraud”
and “[e]mployee disclosures are the most common source of fraud
detection.”247 In fact, whistleblower tips account for more than
Without employeeforty percent of fraud detection.248
whistleblowers, future incidents of large-scale corporate
wrongdoing, as large as Enron249 or Bernie Madoff,250 might be
revealed too late by regulators or might never be revealed.251
Other studies suggest that companies with internal
whistleblowing procedures receive an increased number of
whistleblower reports.252 One reason for this increase is that
employees feel loyal to their employers and choose to report
possible violations internally through their employers’ internal
procedures in the first instance.253 Internal whistleblowers tend to
be long-term employees with the requisite institutional knowledge
who are disappointed by corporate misconduct and believe their
employers’ best interests are served by reporting corporate
misconduct internally.254 It is only when these loyal employeewhistleblowers receive no response from their employers, fear
retaliation, or suffer from retaliation that they choose to disclose
misconduct externally,255 at which point it may already be too late

246. Id. The study was conducted by Alexander Dyck, an economist at the
University of Toronto, and looked at 216 instances of corporate fraud occurring
between 1996 and 2004 in United States companies with over $750 million in assets. Id.
at 107 n.254.
247. Id. at 108.
248. Id.
249. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
250. Bernie Madoff, a former hedge fund manager, perpetrated what is thought
to be the largest Ponzi scheme in history by taking nearly $50 billion from investors.
Robert Lenzer, Bernie Madoff’s $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2008,
6:45
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/12/madoff-ponzi-hedge-pf-iiin_rl_1212croesus_inl.html [http://perma.cc/Q8KU-WBYQ?type=live]. He perpetrated
his fraud by promising investors steady double-digit returns. Id. If Madoff’s investors
had not requested $7 billion in redemptions, his scheme may never have been
discovered. Id. In fact, the SEC failed to discover Madoff’s fraud, even after receiving
several detailed and creditable complaints and failing to properly examine his activities.
Jennifer Liberto, SEC investigation: We missed Madoff, CNNMONEY (Sept. 2, 2009,
8:52 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/02/news/economy/Madoff_SEC_investigation/
[http://perma.cc/353R-H6BL].
251. Rapp, supra note 46, at 109.
252. Moberly, supra note 45, at 1141.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1142.
255. Callahan et al., supra note 41, at 195; Rapp, supra note 46, at 115–19. In
2014, the SEC made two whistleblower awards to employee-whistleblowers when their
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for these employee-whistleblowers to receive retaliation protection
under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the anti-retaliation
provision.256
When a company is engaged in wrongdoing, the failure to
protect employee-whistleblowers is synonymous with the law
encouraging other employees to engage in wrongdoing and behave
immorally.257 Responsible employers should encourage their
employees to report misconduct by implementing and supporting
internal whistleblowing procedures and providing retaliation
protection.258
Such actions demonstrate the employers’
commitment to ethical behavior, and can improve employee
morale when employees know they can put a stop to corporate
misconduct.259
Yet, in most instances, rather than being viewed as a hero or
respected by their peers, whistleblowers tend to be “treated with
scorn and disdain and are often rewarded with labels such as
‘snitch,’ ‘rat,’ and ‘tattle-tale.’”260 Recent studies have found that
eighty-two percent of employee-whistleblowers reported being
“fired, quit under duress, or had significantly altered [job]
responsibilities,” and up to sixty-four percent have “reported being
blacklisted from other jobs in their field.”261 When employeewhistleblowers are adequately protected, they will internally report

employers failed to act upon creditable allegations of corporate misconduct. 2014
Annual Report, supra note 60, at 1. In both instances, the employee-whistleblowers
worked through their employers’ internal whistleblower procedures for reporting
potential violations. Id. It was only when the employers failed to timely respond and
take appropriate corrective action that the employee-whistleblowers made external
reports to the SEC. Id.
256. See supra Part II.C.1.
257. Culp, supra note 242, at 131.
258. Id. at 132; see also Callahan, et al., supra note 41, at 196. Organizational
emphasis on internal procedures and procedural justice will likely enhance an
employee’s willingness to follow corporate policies. Lobel, supra note 43, at 1250.
When internal reporting systems are communicated effectively to employees and
proper training is received, the employer can assist in creating a culture of shared
values where all employees feel responsible for making sure the company operates
within the law and ethics. Letter from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President and Gen.
Couns., Ass’n of Corp. Couns., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2-3 (Dec. 15,
2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-126.pdf [http://perma.cc/TLK9XFWQ]. However, these internal systems will not work if employees do not feel
protected in reporting wrongdoing. Id.
259. Callahan et al., supra note 41, at 196.
260. Culp, supra note 242, at 115.
261. Rapp, supra note 46, at 113–14. One whistleblower, a nuclear physicist,
stated he was moved into a broom closet, his computer was taken, and he was
eventually moved into the mailroom. Id.
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instances of misconduct before such misconduct can be detected
externally.262 It is precisely for these reasons that employeewhistleblowers are in the most need of retaliation protection.
The Second Circuit and majority of courts’ interpretation of
the anti-retaliation provision263 would protect these loyal employeewhistleblowers from retaliation by their employers. It would allow
employee-whistleblowers to do what they perceive as morally right
(i.e., report potential misconduct internally) in order to help
protect the company and its reputation in the marketplace. By not
providing these employee-whistleblowers with retaliation
protection, they will be forced to either make an external report to
the SEC, in which case any company incentive for self-reporting
misconduct would vanish,264 or choose to say nothing at all
regarding the misconduct, thereby allowing the misconduct to
continue.
D. Public Policy Considerations
In issuing its Rule, the SEC was determined to ensure that the
Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Program would not undercut the
willingness of an employee-whistleblower to report securities law
violations through his employer’s internal whistleblowing
procedures.265 The Whistleblower Program was designed to
encourage internal whistleblower reports of potential misconduct
rather than to weaken or replace internal compliance policies and
procedures.266 Furthermore, its success relies on the protection of
whistleblowers.267 While the Whistleblower Program provides
262. Dworkin, supra note 42, at 462.
263. See supra Part II.C.2.
264. See supra Part III.B.
265. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 3; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 2–3.
“Recognizing the significant role that internal company reporting can play, Congress
for nearly two decades has enacted a series of amendments to the securities laws to
encourage, and in some instances to require, internal reporting of potential
misconduct.” Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 6. In fact, the OWB is examining
confidentiality, separation, and employment agreements to determine whether any
provisions in those agreements may discourage employees from becoming
whistleblowers. Michael Sackheim, Seminar: Ethical Issues Confronting Lawyers in
the Financial Services Industry in 2014, INT. SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC. 22
(July 16, 2014) (on file with author) (citation omitted). “[I]f [the OWB] find[s] that
kind of language, not only [is the OWB] going to go to the companies, [it is] going to go
after the lawyers who drafted it.” Id.
266. 2014 Annual Report, supra note 60, at 2.
267. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 2 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/owb/annual-report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/X5QX-N22N].
The OWB is

40

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

incentives for whistleblowers to report possible misconduct (e.g.,
the possibility of a bounty), it also encourages employeewhistleblowers to work within their respective employers’ own
compliance policies and procedures.268
Refusing to provide
retaliation protection to employee-whistleblowers who make
internal reports in the first instance could cause the unintended
consequence of employee-whistleblowers completely foregoing
their employers’ internal compliance procedures and instead
reporting directly to the SEC.269
Congress, clearly appreciating the significant role that internal
reporting can play, has enacted a number of amendments to the
securities laws in order to encourage, and in some instances
require, the internal reporting of possible misconduct.270 One
challenge for the SEC during its rulemaking under the Dodd-Frank
Act was to ensure employees were not dissuaded from reporting
internally.271 Such a result could lead to a reduction in the
effectiveness of employers’ existing compliance policies and
procedures, and their ability to investigate and respond to possible
misconduct.272
Like Congress, the SEC recognizes that employeewhistleblowing plays an important role in ensuring compliance with
the federal securities laws and assists a company in identifying,
correcting, and self-reporting violations, thereby critically
enhancing its own enforcement objectives and its ability to bring
enforcement actions against employers that retaliate against their
employees for internal reporting.273 Internal reporting systems are
essential sources of information regarding misconduct.274 If such
internal reporting systems are not utilized, the system of securities
regulation will be less effective.275 With this in mind, the SEC
actively working with the Enforcement Division of the SEC to identify employers who
have taken retaliatory actions against employees for reporting potential misconduct or
instances where confidentiality, severance, or other agreements have been used to
prohibit an employee from making reports regarding potential misconduct. Id.
268. Id. at 4.
269. Id. at 2.
270. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 5.
271. Id. at 10.
272. Id.
273. Id.; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 5.
274. Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17, at 1836. Without internal
employee-whistleblower reports, future incidents of corporate wrongdoing, as large as
Enron or the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme, may never be revealed or revealed too late.
Rapp, supra note 46, at 109.
275. Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17, at 1836.
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issued its Rule to provide strong incentives for employeewhistleblowers to report misconduct internally when appropriate.276
In May of 2014, the Nebraska District Court, part of the
majority position, decided Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC,277 in
which the court specifically addressed the hypothetical posed by
the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.278 The
Nebraska District Court explained that “[i]n the whistleblower
context, there are three major players: employee-whistleblowers,
employers, and the SEC.”279 From the employer’s point of view,
the hypothetical posed in Asadi creates an odd standard of liability
where liability for retaliation attaches only when certain
preconditions, of which the employer is unaware, are satisfied.280
The Nebraska District Court further explained that the
hypothetical is also under-inclusive from the employeewhistleblower’s point of view and over-inclusive from the SEC’s
point of view, because the hypothetical fails to account for the fact
that most employees tend to report violations internally to their
employers before disclosing violations externally to the SEC.281
Employees tend to report internally first for a number of reasons:
they are not motivated by financial gain and the prospect of a
bounty is not a factor in their decision; employees feel a sense of
loyalty to their employers and want to give their employers a
chance to correct the violation; and employees may not know to
report externally to the SEC to receive retaliation protection.282
The Nebraska District Court stated that “under Asadi, not
only does the law fail to protect the majority of whistleblowers, it
fails to protect those who are most vulnerable to retaliation.”283
The court refused to attribute an intent to Congress that would
offer broad retaliation protection only to take it away, leaving
behind retaliation protection for only a small group of
whistleblowers.284 It also refused to conclude that Congress
intended to depart from the “general practice of first making an

276. Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 3.
277. 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014).
278. 720 F.3d 620, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2013). See supra p. 21–22 for the text of the
hypothetical posed by the Fifth Circuit in Asadi.
279. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 732.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 732–33.
283. Id. at 733.
284. Id.
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internal report.”285
The Nebraska District Court explained that internal reporting
serves many important interests, such as allowing a company to
remediate misconduct at an early stage and helping the SEC to vet
the tips it receives.286 Failing to protect employee-whistleblowers
who report internally will frustrate a company’s internal
compliance procedures and might deter employees from
participating in an internal investigation.287 “[F]rom the SEC’s
perspective, the Asadi interpretation is over-inclusive, as it
encourages reports to the SEC that could be more efficiently
handled internally, thus wasting government resources generally
and diverting resources from cases that need the SEC’s full
attention.”288 While “Congress [may have] aimed to encourage
whistleblowers to report to the SEC[,] . . . it does not follow that
Congress intended to discourage internal reporting.”289
Additionally, in supporting the majority position in Ellington
v. Giacoumakis, the Massachusetts District Court stated:
[i]t is apparent from the wording and positioning of § 78u6(h)(1)(B)(i)290 that Congress intended that an employee
terminated for reporting [SOX] violations to a supervisor . . .
and ultimately to the SEC, [to] have a private right of action
under Dodd-Frank whether or not the employer wins the race
to the SEC’s door with a termination notice.291

Simply put, the Massachusetts District Court believed it unfair
for an employee-whistleblower to lose retaliation protection under
the Dodd-Frank Act after reporting a possible securities law
violation internally first, if the employer is protected from its
retaliation by firing the employee-whistleblower before the
employee-whistleblower can make a subsequent report to the SEC,
which is precisely the outcome that results from the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation.

285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. “An individual who alleges discharge or other discrimination in violation of
subparagraph (A) [the anti-retaliation provision] may bring an action under this
subsection in the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief provided
in subparagraph (C).” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (2014).
291. 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013).
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CONCLUSION
Internal whistleblowing is a useful tool for both companies and
the SEC to combat violations of the securities laws. Internal
reporting procedures allow a company to detect corporate
misconduct and self-report those violations to the SEC, which can
result in reduced monetary fines and sanctions and can help to
protect a company’s reputation in the marketplace.292 The SEC
recognized the benefits of internal whistleblowing when it utilized
its rulemaking authority under the Dodd-Frank Act.293 The SEC
interpreted subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s294
protected activities as an exception to the whistleblower definition
to provide retaliation protection to employee-whistleblowers who
report possible securities law violations internally through their
employers’ whistleblowing procedures, rather than only providing
protection when employee-whistleblowers make external reports to
the SEC.295
Circuit courts of appeal and other district courts should reject
the Fifth Circuit and minority of courts’ interpretation and follow
the Second Circuit and majority of district courts to find that
subsection (iii) provides anti-retaliation protection to employeewhistleblowers who report possible securities law violations
internally from the retaliatory actions of their employers. By not
protecting employee-whistleblowers who report internally, future
circuit courts of appeal and district courts will impair the very
purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act, which is “[t]o promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices . . . .”296 Failure
to protect employee-whistleblowers who make internal reports of
misconduct will only encourage retaliation against the group of
individuals who need this protection the most. Moreover, it is only
fair and reasonable that these employee-whistleblowers receive
adequate protection of the law when reporting its very violation.

292. Bishara et al., supra note 40, at 39–40; Callahan et al., supra note 41.
293. Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 6.
294. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (West 2015), invalidated by Asadi v. G.E. Energy
(USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
295. See supra Part II.C.3.
296. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (codified
in scattered sections of Titles 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 of the United States Code).

